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Groundwater Pollution Control: A
National Aim, A Regional Strategy
Sheila F. Anthony*
I.

Introduction

"The civilization that fails to protect and husband the
waters it uses for drinking, agriculture, industry, and energy is
courting failure."' Despite this caveat, groundwater, a resource essential to life and our agricultural and economic sustenance, continues to be threatened.2 Contamination of
groundwater by volatile organic chemicals and other pollutants has become a common occurrence.3 The forced closing of
wells due to groundwater contamination problems now occurs
throughout the country.4 The massive national cleanup efforts
associated with landmark environmental legislation of recent
years has largely ignored groundwater; in fact, such legislation
has often increased groundwater contamination by encouraging diversion of pollutants from the air and surface waters to
the ground. 5
* Copyright 1985. B.A., Univ. of Arkansas; J.D., American Univ. Dow, Lohnes &
Albertson (Washington, D.C.).
1. Conservation Foundation Letter, Groundwater Supplies: Are They Imperiled?
1 (June 1981).
2. Groundwater represents 24% of the domestic, agricultural, and industrial
water used in the United States. From 1950-1980, groundwater use in the United
States increased from withdrawals of 34 billion gallons per day to 89 billion gallons
per day. Current groundwater withdrawals are estimated at 100 billion gallons per
day. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Office of Ground-Water Protection),
A Ground-Water Protection Strategy for the Environmental Protection Agency 10
(1984) [hereinafter cited as 1984 EPA Groundwater Strategy].
3. See id. at 12-13. Many chemical groundwater contaminants are toxic, and
some, such as benzene and trichloroethylene, are suspected carcinogens. Id.
4. See, e.g., Burmaster, The New Pollution: Groundwater Contamination,Env't,
Mar. 1982, at 7, 9-11.
5. See Tripp & Jaffe, Preventing Groundwater Pollution; Towards A Coordinated Strategy to Protect Critical Recharge Zones, 3 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (1979).
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The nature of groundwater has generally been greatly
misunderstood. Until recently, drinking water drawn from the
ground was viewed as a pristine resource, unspoiled by human
activities. Although groundwater is often erroneously thought
of as a series of underground streams or rivers, it is actually
all water which exists beneath the surface of the ground.'
Groundwater moves primarily in response to gravity, and
movement is slow; velocities generally range from five to fifty
feet per year. 7 Contaminants which reach aquifers move in
plumes, generally at the same speed and in the same direction
as the groundwater." Plume-type contaminant movement results in little mixing or dispersion of the contaminant; thus
contaminant concentration levels remain high.9 Landfills, septic tanks, toxic and hazardous materials, municipal and industrial waste discharges and impoundments, wastes from concentrated animal feeding operations, agricultural fertilizers
and pesticides, and saltwater intrusion from overdrafting of
aquifers are proving to be major causes of groundwater contamination in many areas of the country. 10 Recovery from
6. W.B. Solley, E.B. Chase & W.B. Mann, Estimated Use of Water in the United
States in 1980, at v (1983) (U.S. Geological Survey Circular No. 1001). Groundwater
occurs in both unconfined and confined aquifers. Generally, aquifers are geological
formations that contain enough saturated permeable materials to yield usable
amounts of water to wells and springs. Id. at vi. There are basically two types of
aquifers: unconfined and confined. Unconfined aquifers are not overlain by impermeable strata; thus water from rain or snow melt may percolate through the soil to the
aquifer. Contaminants may also reach an unconfined aquifer via this mechanism. In
contrast, confined aquifers are bounded top and bottom by layers of relatively impermeable geologic strata, and thus have a restricted recharge area. In some cases, confined aquifers have no recharge area, and may be considered a finite natural resource.
Aquifers may be thick or thin, extensive or local, near the surface, or in the case of
confined aquifers, at considerable depths. See generally V.I. Pye, Environment Assessment Council Report on Groundwater Contamination: Summary of the Assessment of Extent and Severity of Groundwater Contamination in the United States
(Oct. 6, 1982) (briefing given under auspices of the Environment Assessment Council,
Academy of Natural Sciences of Philadelphia, Pa.).
7. V.I. Pye, supra note 6; see also 1984 EPA Groundwater Strategy, supra note
2, at 11.
8. V.I. Pye, supra note 6.
9. 1984 EPA Groundwater Strategy, supra note 2, at 11.
10. For example, a surface impoundment assessment funded by EPA and conducted by the states found 176,647 industrial landfills, lagoons, and other waste impoundments. A preliminary analysis of them indicated that 70% had no lining and
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such contamination is slow; in fact, "it may be considered a
semi-permanent condition once it has occurred."'"
Obviously, prevention is better than cure. However, as
one commentator has noted:
Preventive measures must fit into some type of comprehensive management scheme to safeguard a resource
that has a host of claimants; that is beset by many types
of contamination; that frequently raises interstate issues;
that sometimes is closely related to surface water supplies; and that can involve both the quantity and quality
of the groundwater. 1
In addition, any comprehensive management scheme
must deal with the stifling institutional and legal framework
which has left groundwater largely unprotected thus far.'"
This article examines the adequacy of our institutions for
dealing with groundwater pollution and outlines the history of
attempts by the federal Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to establish a national groundwater policy. It also discusses the authority of Congress and the states to create an
interjurisdictional approach to management and control of
groundwater pollution. Finally, a proposal for new federal legislation employing such an approach, based upon observations
and recommendations by other commentators, is offered.
II.

The Existing Organizational Framework

Inherent in the concept of water management is the nature of dominance. Where are decisions made? Who defines
the questions? Who chooses which answers are best? 4 The
levels at which water management organizations have func95% had no groundwater monitoring system to detect toxic contamination. See U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (Office of Drinking Water), Surface Impoundment
Assessment National Report (Jan. 7, 1983) (draft report).
11. Center for Environmental Research/Cooperative Extension (Cornell Univ.),
Groundwater Supply Issues: A GAO Assessment (July 27, 1979).
12. Conservation Foundation Letter, supra note 1, at 3 (emphasis in original).
13. See, e.g., Mosher, Life Without Water, 15 Nat'l J. 568 (1983).

14. A. Peralta, Alternative Institutional Arrangements for Water Management in
Arkansas 19 (May 1982) (Graduate Thesis, Univ. of Ark.).
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tioned in the United States are federal, interstate, regional,
state, substate, and local. Each has strengths and weaknesses,
and none is mutually exclusive. Institutional problems are
tied to hundreds of statutory, administrative, and regulatory
institutions which affect the quality of our waters. Some of
these vehicles are complex, work at cross purposes, or are obsolete. A principal reason for their lack of success is that the
solutions they propose often attack strong local interests
which are supported by considerable political strength. Resolution of many tough institutional problems will probably entail the expenditure of considerable legislative time, generate
heated disputes, and create political risks. Nevertheless, unless some fundamental changes are made, the vast technical
ability of this nation to solve its water problems may be
greatly limited. 5
Three features of the existing organizational framework
dominate considerations of reform. First, there is the inefficiency and diffusion of effort associated with the large number
of state agencies concerned with water quality, production,
services, and management.1 6 A better rationalization of agency
jurisdiction and power through consolidation and centralized
authority would contribute a great deal and provide more efficient and economical management.17 Nevertheless, a unified
state approach is not the final answer due to the interstate
nature of aquifer systems and groundwater pollution.
Second, there is the fragmentation associated with the
large number of Congressional committees and subcommittees
with water related responsibilities, whose ties are often to spe15. Viesman, Water Policy Reform: An Institutional Dilemma, Cong. Research
Service Rev., 97th Cong., at 19-22 (1981).
16. See Zerbe, Optimal Environmental Jurisdictions,4 Ecology L.Q. 193, 235
(1974).
17. But see A. Maass & R.L. Anderson, ...
and the Desert Shall Rejoice: Conflict, Growth, and Justice in Arid Environments 366-67 (1978). The authors conclude
that those viewing central agency dominance as workable inevitably "have underestimated the farmers' capacities to organize collectively to avoid such a result and have
overestimated the facility of top control." Id. at 366. It was also found that, in areas
studied, orders issued by higher authorities were often defied or disregarded when
they conflicted with the united preference of local users. Id. at 366-67.
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cial interests in Congress. 18 Legislative behavior is in many respects similar to that of agencies. However, it suffers from the
defects of the political marketplace and from bargaining
problems. "[V]otes usually cannot be concentrated and decisions often call for all-or-nothing votes . ...
"19 Overlapping
authorities each have an incentive to leave treatment of national water quality problems to others, yet many of these authorities are dismayed at the failure of others to address such
problems. In addition, there is the problem of "turf fights"
when an issue of national prominence arises coupled with the
political rewards of capturing headlines. The result is often
tremendous duplication of time, staff effort, and financial resources as well as the fostering of program inconsistencies.
The final feature affecting reform is the lack of coordination among agencies. In 1978, 225 million dollars was spent by
twenty-two federal agencies on water research, while only ten
to twelve million dollars went into pure or basic groundwater
research.20 Each of these agencies also does research to sup18. There are four Senate full committees, seven Senate subcommittees, eight
House of Representatives full committees and eleven House subcommittees with
water-related responsibilities, as follows. In the Senate: Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development; Subcommittee on Interior;
Subcommittee on Transportation; Committee on the Budget; Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources, Subcommittee on Public Lands and Reserved Water; Subcommittee on Water and Power; Committee on Environment and Public Works, Subcommittee on Transportation; Subcommittee on Water Resources. In the House:
Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development;
Subcommittee on Interior; Subcommittee on Transportation; Committee on the
Budget; Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Commerce, Transportation and Tourism; Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power; Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Environment, Energy, and Natural
Resources; Committee on Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment, Subcommittee on Water and Power Resources; Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation; Committee on
Public Works and Transportation, Subcommittee on Water Resources; Committee on
Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Natural Resources, Agriculture, Research
and Environment.
19. See Zerbe, supra note 16, at 212.
20. See Ground Water Quality Research & Development: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Environment and the Atmosphere of the House Comm. on Science
and Technology, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 242-44 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Hearings]; see also Copeland, Water Quality: Implementing the Clean Water Act, Cong.
Research Serv. (issue brief IB 79091). EPA water quality program budgetary trends

5

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2

port its own mission. Yet the overall question is whether the
total collection of those activities is meeting the nation's
needs. The requirement of leadership in the coordinating area
is not currently being met, as there is no one group overlooking and coordinating federal water research programs."
Therefore, it is important to establish an information base
upon which water resources activities of the country may be
carefully analyzed (by some administrative mechanism or
clearing house) to determine the existence of information gaps
and unnecessary duplication, and to coordinate interdisciplinary research among federal agencies.
III.

The Evolution of EPA's Groundwater Protection
Strategy

Under existing statutes, EPA has considerable responsibility for groundwater protection.2 3 This includes planning
with the states pursuant to the Clean Water Act (CWA), 4
controlling hazardous wastes pursuant to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),' 5 controlling underground injection and protecting sole source aquifers pursuant
to the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 (SDWA), e cleaning
in research and development in the fiscal years 1982-1984 showed a reduction from
$31.7 million to $12.2 million. The Administration request for fiscal year 1984-1985
called for a 47.5% reduction to $6.4 million. For abatement, control, and compliance,
the Administration requested a 43.9% reduction to $61.7 million for fiscal year 1984
from fiscal year 1983 levels of $111 million. See Review of Ground Water Protection
Strategy Recently Proposed by the Environmental Protection Agency: Hearings
Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 130-50 (1984) [hereinafter cited as 1984 Hearings].
21. See 1978 Hearings, supra note 20, at 242.
22. Id. at 239. Federal agencies to which this applies include EPA, U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), U.S. Dep't of Interior (DOI), U.S. Dep't of Energy (DOE), U.S.
Dep't of Agriculture (DOA), U.S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM), U.S. Forest
Service (USFS), and U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Development (HUD).
23. See, e.g., Horne, Groundwater Policy: A Patchwork of Protection, Env't,
April 1982 at 7-11, 35.
24. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982). Commentators have recommended further
amendments of the Act so that it may be construed to cover ground as well as surface
waters. See generally Tripp & Jaffee, supra note 5, at 10-14.
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982).
26. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f, 300h-1, 300h-3 (1982).
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hazardous waste sites pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA),27 controlling toxic chemicals pursuant to RCRA
and the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 28 and controlling pesticides pursuant to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) 9
EPA's critics have focused on several problems: lack of
regulatory predictability and consistency, delays in promulgating regulations, the severity and inflexibility of regulations
which do not accommodate the great variations in natural climate, geohydrological conditions and groundwater uses in
particular areas, and lack of coordination and cross-purposes
of many existing statutes.8 0
In addition, many states, industries, and businesses are
concerned that EPA exceeds its authority with unwarranted
federal intrusion in attempts to propose a national groundwater protection strategy. They fear that EPA will arbitrarily
over-classify aquifer use, and contend that there is no real crisis in groundwater pollution. Their position is that EPA input
should be limited to guidance, technical assistance, and education of the public.3 1 Conversely, many states, environmental
groups, scientists, and groundwater administrators support a
strong EPA role. They feel that such a role is necessary to
avoid industry's flight to "pollution haven" states, and to regulate groundwater pollution of aquifers which cross state lines
(a problem associated with strict pollution standards in one
state and loose standards in a neighboring state). However,
most states are concerned that EPA will mandate inflexible
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982).
28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982).
29. 7 U.S.C. § 136a-y (1982). Note also that DOI has responsibility pursuant to
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA), 30 U.S.C. §§
1201-1328 (1982) to minimize effects of surface mine pollution of groundwater.
30. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Office of Drinking Water), Public Comments on the Proposed Ground Water Protection Strategy (July 23, 1981)
(unpublished) [hereinafter cited as 1980 EPA Groundwater Strategy: Public Comments. See also Viesman, supra note 15, at 19.
31. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Office of Drinking Water), Selected
Comments by Business and Industry on the Proposed Ground Water Protection
Strategy (1981) (unpublished).
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classifications based on use, but not tailored to varying geographic and geohydrologic conditions: that is, relying on judgment rather than science. One example of this concern is the
fear that EPA will use the "lowest common denominator" of
degradation of aquifers, and by doing so will intrude into state
allocation laws, and be susceptible to politically expedient decisions. Many of these concerns are well founded.
A.

EPA's 1980 Proposed Strategy

The issue of groundwater protection did not really
emerge as worthy of national attention until the 96th Congress convened in 1979. In the second session, the House
Committee on Government Operations published a report entitled "Interim Report on Groundwater Contamination: Environmental Protection Agency Oversight.""3 The committee
considered the growing trend of groundwater contamination
"one of the most serious environmental problems of the
1980's,"'" and further stated that "[f]ederal programs
designed to protect groundwater have been placed on the back
burner too long."' 35 The report recommended that EPA continue vigorous cooperation with the states to establish as
swiftly as possible a national groundwater policy.3
EPA took the first steps towards the development of a
national groundwater protection strategy by assigning its Office of Water and Waste Management the responsibility for
developing the strategy and outlining a three-phase approach.3 7 EPA developed a proposed strategy, and offered the
32. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Office of Drinking Water), State
Comments on Proposed Ground Water Protection Strategy (1981) (unpublished).
33. See H.R. Rep. No. 1440, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
34. Id. at 3.
35. Id. at 4.
36. Id.
37. The proposed EPA approach consisted of three phases:
Phase I. Assemble existing information on groundwater use and pollution, state laws and programs, and the state-of-the-art in groundwater
protection.
Phase II. Conduct workshops involving state and local governmental officials, environmental organizations, business and industry, public interest
groups, and professional persons. From the workshops, develop a wide range
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proposal for public comment on November 24, 1980.8 However, the proposal was less a single strategy than a collection
of alternative courses of action which the scheduled future
hearings might address. The proposal left unanswered the basic goal of the groundwater protection strategy, but stated a
proposed goal derived from general agreement of the Phase II
workshops: "It shall be the national goal to assess, protect,
and enhance the quality of groundwaters to the level necessary for current and projected future users and for the protection of public health and significant ecological systems."3 9
EPA queried whether the policy goal should be the protection
of present and future users of groundwater, or the
nondegradation of existing groundwater quality. The proposal
also specifically asked for comments on the role of existing
state programs, the utility of groundwater classification as an
approach in setting priorities for groundwater protection, the
usefulness of identifying appropriate sites for new hazardous
waste disposal facilities, and the extent of the federal role in
40
groundwater protection.
The proposed strategy outlined an approach to managing
groundwater protection based on four key elements: state
groundwater protection strategies, a groundwater classification system, minimum national requirements for selected high
priority problems, and EPA administrative actions.4 '
The development of protection strategies by the individual states was intended not only as a framework for planning,
of recommendations for EPA's consideration.
Phase III. Publish and distribute a proposed strategy and hold at least
five hearings throughout the country on the proposed strategy.
See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Office of Drinking Water), Proposed
Ground Water Protection Strategy (1980). [hereinafter cited as 1980 EPA Groundwater Strategy].
38. See 45 Fed. Reg. 77514 (Nov. 24, 1980).
39. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Office of Research and Development), Proceedings of the Fourth National Ground Water Quality Symposium (Aug.
1979); see also U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Office of Drinking Water),
Planning Workshops to Develop Recommendations for Ground Water Protection
Strategy 5 (Nov. 1980).
40. See 45 Fed. Reg. 77514 (Nov. 24, 1980); see also 1980 EPA Groundwater
Strategy, supra note 37.
41. See 1980 EPA Groundwater Strategy, supra note 37, at 6.
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implementation, and enforcement activities at state and local
levels, but also to assure that primary authority over groundwater issues was retained by the individual states. EPA proposed to assist the states in preparing strategies by providing
guidance, technical assistance, funding from existing federal
programs, and grants under state-EPA agreements. "s
Under the proposal, the development and implementation of a groundwater classification scheme would require different roles for EPA and the states. Stating the need for nationwide consistency in the definitions and categories used,
EPA proposed to take the lead and develop a common classification scheme to facilitate cooperation in dealing with interstate issues and to provide a more understandable regulatory
environment from state to state for businesses and individuals. This was needed to ensure that the intent of federally
mandated programs and laws was carried out in all states.
43
The states would make and enforce the permitting decisions.
The classification system would be based on three factors: the
current and projected future use of an aquifer, the vulnerability of the source to contamination, and the level of control
required."
Where the threat to groundwater resources was national
in scope, complexity, or severity, EPA expected to establish
national control requirements. Some of the areas would include: interstate issues such as waste disposal, development of
maximum contaminate and no adverse-risk levels for organics
and other compounds in drinking water, development of a national data base (including guidelines on monitoring methods
and data reporting, storage, and dissemination), establishment
of procedures for handling detected cases of contamination,
and identification of areas for further study, such as contamination by underground storage tanks. 45 EPA also included a
statement of the necessity for uniformity among the states to
42. Id. at VII-4.
43. Id. at VII-8.
44. Id. at VII-4.
45. See Ross, EPA's Proposed Strategy: Protectingthe Nation's Ground Water,
53 J. Water Pollution Control Fed'n 287 (Mar. 1981).
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avoid major economic dislocations and the establishment of
46
de facto pollution havens.
B.

The Public Comments

In January 1981, public hearings were held on the proposed strategy in six locations around the country. An analysis of the public comments reveals that approximately half of
the commenters challenged the proposed goal based on current and projected future use. They instead called for a policy
of nondegradation to protect future generations who may become dependent on groundwater for drinking water. The supporters of multiple use for groundwater agreed that
nondegradation was unworkable in our present technological
society and that tradeoffs should be approached in a pragmatic, straightforward manner.
On the subject of groundwater classification, approximately sixty percent favored the concept as an effective and
useful way to set priorities. A vast majority agreed that the
fundamental responsibility for classifying groundwater should
rest with the states, and that the EPA role was to provide
research and development, financial assistance, technical assistance, and to draw together national experts, state and local
officials, and business representatives to outline classification
principles.' 7 One major issue was that of resolving differences
among the states on how to classify contiguous aquifers. Several commenters suggested that this was an appropriate role
for EPA or some other federal agency. Others pointed out the
need for flexibility to accommodate the wide variation in geologic and hydrologic conditions, water uses, and availability.
Some indicated that any classification system should cover
both surface and groundwater because of their interconnection and interdependence."8 Many of those who opposed classification did so on the basis that the variation among groundwater formations, uses, and quality was so vastly different
from place to place that it was impossible to construct and
46. See 1980 EPA Groundwater Strategy, supra note 37, at VII-10.
47. See 1980 EPA Groundwater Strategy: Public Comments, supra note 30.
48. Id. at 14-15.
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apply a national policy or uniform standards in all states.49
The general consensus was in favor of EPA taking a leadership role and the states carrying out the basic operating func50
tions on a volunteer basis.
About forty percent of the reviewers felt there was a need
to strengthen federal authority in the area of groundwater
protection." Everyone who discussed research and development supported the need for a major expansion. Specific areas
of concern were acquifer recharge, in-situ combustion impacts,
uranium mining, economic effects of practices to protect and
treat groundwater to make it usable, health risks, contamina5 2
tion movement, and remedial potential.
C.

EPA's 1983 Proposed Groundwater Policy

EPA's work on the strategy document of 1980 was held in
abeyance pending review by the Reagan administration. In
1982, after review and substantial revision by then-EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch Burford, the second draft of the revised groundwater policy was sent for consideration to the
Cabinet Council on Natural Resources and Environment, and
its chairman, then-Secretary of Interior James G. Watt. It was
also submitted to the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB)for comments. 3
In early 1983, EPA publicly set forth its revised groundwater policy.54 There were several major differences between
the 1983 groundwater policy and the 1980 strategy document.
The stated goal of the 1983 policy was "[tlo safeguard the
public health and sensitive environmental systems by protect49. Id. at 15.

50. Id.
51. Id. at 27. Specific examples of bolstered federal authority include adding authority to CWA to have National Point Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits cover groundwater as well as surface waters, and strengthening the Sole Source
Aquifer program under the SDWA.
52. Id. at 27-28.
53. Personal briefing of the author by Marian Mlay, Attorney and Deputy Director, EPA Office of Drinking Water (Jan. 1983).
54. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Office of Drinking Water), Proposed
Ground Water Policy (Feb. 2, 1983) (unpublished draft) [hereinafter cited as 1983
EPA Groundwater Policy].
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ing the quality of ground water, taking into consideration current and projected future uses, consistent with statutory
objectives."5 5 Two principle reasons were given for this approach: First, "not all groundwater is of a quality that is suitable for all uses because of either its natural quality or due to
irreversible man-induced contamination."56 Second, "in managing resources in an industrialized society, choices must be
made concerning waste management based upon a balancing
of technological know-how and alternatives, cost and the degree of health or environmental protection needed to protect
' 57
the public interest.
The 1983 document also stated that the language was
chosen carefully and reflected conscious policy choices regarding goals and competing interests:
EPA believes that while a goal of non-degradation may be
necessary in some circumstances, we do not believe that
the general goal of preventing all contamination is appropriate for universal application ....
*. . We recognize too, that the protection of ground
water may involve national, state, corporate and individual interests. Its protection must be carried out within
statutory constraints. Finally, we recognize the need for
flexibility to accommodate the great variations across the
nation in natural climatic, geologic and hydrologic conditions and in the uses of ground water. 8
The draft then listed seven operating principles which
guided EPA in the preparation of this policy, setting forth
both the philosophy and tone underlying EPA's approach:
(1) State and local governments, by virtue of their
jurisdiction over land use and because of their broad
public health and police powers, should have the lead
role in developing and implementing plans to protect
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 12.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 12-13.
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groundwater quality.
(2) Existing institutional and statutory powers
should be fully utilized and coordinated to achieve the
groundwater protection goal.
(3) In administering federal environmental laws,
EPA must give the states maximum flexibility consistent
with statutory requirements to develop effective groundwater strategies tailored to meet local needs and
conditions.
(4) Groundwater quality protection should be established as a unifying goal linking all relevant EPA program activities.
(5) All available data should be utilized to provide
the public with more information and a better understanding of groundwater resources, the significance of
groundwater contamination, and means of safeguarding
its quality.
(6) Groundwater policy decisions should be based on
the best scientific evidence available: research efforts
should be strengthened, where necessary, to expand this
base of knowledge.
(7) Water quality and water quantity are closely
linked. Water allocations are beyond the scope of EPA
authority, but are within the jurisdictions of the states.5 9
It is in the policy implementation where the greatest difference lies between the 1980 and 1983 proposals. The 1980
strategy clearly anticipated a joint effort by federal, state, and
local governments. However, major elements of the 1983 strategy were heavily tilted toward state initiatives, with EPA's
role being primarily one of encouragement, exchange of information, and technical assistance. There is no mention of a national aquifer classification system in the 1983 strategy. Instead, states were given the discretion to develop and
implement statewide groundwater strategies and implementation plans. As stated, EPA's policy was based on the following
elements:
59. Id. at 14-18.
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(1) States coordinate their own pollution control and
waste water management programs which affect groundwater and efforts to protect the public health at the point
of use. Implementation will depend significantly on each
individual state's desire and ability to coordinate its own
efforts.
(2) States carry out groundwater protection program
responsibilities delegated to the states by EPA consistent
with legislative requirements.
(3) States at their discretion develop and implement
statewide groundwater quality strategies and management plans. States determine the nature and extent of
their own problems, approaches for resolution, and resource priorities.6 0
The major task for EPA groundwater policy in 1983 was
limited to coordinating the implementation of existing statutes." This policy appeared in line with the Reagan Administration's philosophy of decentralization and a new focus on
federalism. However, Secretary Watt objected to the policy,
contending it would infringe on state water rights by establishing federal control over groundwater. 2 As a result, the
Council did not approve the policy and all EPA work on the
60. Id. at 19.
61. Id. at 25.
62. See Groundwater Protection: The Quest for a National Policy, H.R. Rep.
No. 55, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1984) [hereinafter cited as GroundwaterProtection].
At its June 29, 1983 hearing the subcommittee placed in the record documents indicating that former Secretary of the Interior James G. Watt had been responsible for
killing EPA's proposed National Groundwater Policy at the February 9, 1983 meeting
of the Cabinet Council on Natural Resources and the Environment, of which he was
then chairman. A February 25, 1983 letter from then-Secretary Watt to all governors
of western states, for example, reads as follows:
There is brewing in Washington an effort by some to establish federal
control over ground water. My basic instincts say that this is wrong. The
draft statement prepared by the EPA is clearly wrong.
The attached news story from the Washington Post is basically correct.
If you and your fellow Western Governors feel that I am right, you had better
join the battle. I cannot win this one without your help.
I am sending identical letters to the other Western Governors and asking
that you folks either tell me that I am doing the wrong thing and I will retreat, or else join the battle and develop a plan for protecting states' rights.
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policy stopped.
In March 1983, after EPA Administrator Burford's resignation, President Reagan appointed a new EPA Administrator, William D. Ruckelshaus. 3 Within a month of his May
1983 confirmation, Mr. Ruckelshaus created a Ground Water
Task Force to prepare options on how to assure coordination
of EPA policies and programs to deal with groundwater.14 Following the task force's report, staff within EPA's Office of
Drinking Water began drafting a third version of an EPA
groundwater strategy. In January 1984, EPA distributed a
draft to selected state, business, industry, and environmental
organizations for comment.6 8 The strategy was subsequently
modified, and the first official policy on groundwater was released on August 30, 1984.66
D.

EPA's 1984 Groundwater Protection Strategy

The 1984 strategy is, in many respects, a composite of the
views stressed in the earlier strategies. As in the 1980 strategy,
the 1984 strategy proposes the use by the federal government
of a groundwater classification system to promote consistency
among different environmental programs. Like the 1983 strategy, the 1984 strategy emphasizes that the states should take
the lead in groundwater protection.6
The four core elements of the 1984 strategy generally refer to what the federal government intends to do about
groundwater protection. They are to:
63. Mr. Ruckelshaus has since resigned as EPA Administrator, and has been replaced by Mr. Lee M. Thomas.
64. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Office of Drinking Water), Ground
Water Coordination Task Force Summary Work Plan (June 23, 1983; rev. July 5,
1983) (unpublished draft).
65. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Office of Drinking Water), A
Ground-Water Protection Strategy for the Environmental Protection Agency (Jan.
1984). See also U.S. General Accounting Office (Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division), Federal and State Efforts to Protect Ground Water 22
(Feb. 21, 1984).
66. See generally 1984 EPA Groundwater Strategy, supra note 2.
67. See D. Feliciano, Comparison of the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency's Groundwater Protection Strategies, Cong. Research Serv. publication No.
84-ENR (Feb. 8, 1984). See also Groundwater Protection,supra note 62, at 10.
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(1) Strengthen state groundwater programs.
(2) Cope with currently unaddressed groundwater
problems.
(3) Create a policy framework for guiding EPA programs.
(4) Strengthen internal groundwater organization. 8
EPA pledged increased financial support to states for
planning and development of groundwater protection programs and institutional capabilities. However, states are encouraged to make use of existing grant programs.6 9 The money
also may be used for creation of needed data systems, assessment of legal and institutional impediments to comprehensive
state management, and the development of regulatory programs such as permitting and classification. EPA intends to
provide technical assistance and a strong research program.7"
In the 1984 strategy, EPA recognizes that contamination
from many sources is not statutorily regulated. Of particular
seriousness are threats posed by leaking underground storage
tanks, surface impoundments, and landfills. 71 However, the
1984 strategy asserts only that EPA will study the effects of
contamination from these sources to establish the need for
regulation. 72 EPA's efforts to protect groundwater from pesticide and nitrate contamination will include required use of
modeling techniques and field monitoring, issuance of health
advisories, use of labeling restrictions, and encouragement of
the implementation of pesticide restrictions through the incorporation of groundwater provisions in state enforcement
73
grant agreements.
The 1984 EPA Groundwater Protection Strategy rejects
as too costly and inefficient an ambient monitoring ap68. See 1984 EPA Groundwater Strategy, supra note 2, at 32-50.
69. In the fiscal year 1985 appropriation act for EPA, Congress specifically rejected the idea of funding additional state groundwater activities through "set asides"
from existing grant programs and added an additional $11,285,000 earmarked specifically for state groundwater activities, including operational activities. See Groundwater Protection,supra note 62, at 15.
70. See 1984 EPA Groundwater Strategy, supra note 2, at 35-36.
71. Id. at 12-16.
72. Id. at 37.
73. Id. at 37-39.
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proach;7 4 instead it relies upon a combination of ambient,
"point of contamination," and "point of use" detection. 7
However, EPA admits that point-of-contamination monitoring has not been done in a systematic way.7 6 Furthermore,
EPA and the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) have reported substantial non-compliance with and lax enforcement
of the RCRA interim regulations requiring water monitoring.
The primary weakness with (supply well) point-of-use monitoring is self-evident. It is after-the-fact contamination, detection of which answers few questions relative to the source of
contamination, direction, and movement of groundwater.
To establish consistency in its approach to a national protection program, EPA developed guidelines for a three-tiered
groundwater classification scheme based on "the highest beneficial use to which the ground-water resource can presently or
potentially be put."78 The three classes are:
I. Special groundwaters, such as sole sources which
are irreplaceable sources of drinking water and are ecologically vital.79
II. Current and potential sources of drinking water
and water having other beneficial uses, which generally
comprises the majority of usable groundwater in the
United States. Prevention of contamination will be provided through technology-based requirements rather than
land use restrictions.8
III. Groundwater not a potential source of drinking
water and of limited beneficial use because of salinity or
74. Id. at 40.
75. Id. at 40-41.
76. Id. at 40.
77. See Memorandum from Gene A. Lucerno, Director, EPA Office of Waste
Programs Enforcement to Air and Hazardous Waste Division Directors, Regions I-X
(Mar. 21, 1983); U.S. General Accounting Office, Interim Report on Inspection, Enforcement, and Permitting Activities at Hazardous Waste Facilities: Report to the
Chairman, Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism, House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce 5-9 (Sept. 21, 1983); see also Groundwater Protection,supra
note 62, at 17-18.
78. See 1984 EPA Groundwater Strategy, supra note 2, at 42.
79. Id. at 43-45.
80. Id. at 45-46.
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other contamination.81

The intent of the 1984 strategy is to work within EPA's
current groundwater programs under existing federal environmental statutes. Apparently responding to criticism of wholeaquifer classification in the draft strategy, the agency makes
the classification site-specific for the reason that parts of aquifers might be significantly different from other parts. Essentially, special and vulnerable groundwaters would receive a
high level of protection, while groundwater that is not a potential source of drinking water or other beneficial use would
not. Variances would be applied as necessary. 2
The 1984 strategy explicitly states that the individual
states are under no obligation to adopt the federal classification system for their own programs, although there is the suggestion that states will generally have to establish programs
which are "no less stringent" than the federal guidelines to
obtain authorization to administer EPA programs.8 3 States
with inadequate staffing and funds to develop their own regulatory requirements or guidelines addressing groundwater may
use the EPA framework although they are not required to do
so. In fact, the states are not required to do anything beyond
8 4
the mandates of the existing environmental statutes.
81. Id. at 46-47.
82. It should also be noted that the classification scheme has been criticized on
other grounds as well:
Beyond the notion of a sliding scale of protection, this classification
framework resolves very little. For example, for both Class I and Class II
ground waters, it is not clear from the strategy whether background conditions or drinking water standards would be the standard by which protection
and cleanup requirements were judged. By skirting the issue, the strategy
preserves the specter of ground water regulation based upon nondegredation
requirements, although the policy is nominally focused upon the need to protect current and potential beneficial uses of groundwater.
Frohardt, EPA's Ground Water Protection Strategy: Much Ado About Nothing?,
Nat. Resources & Env't, Winter 1985, at 61.
83. 1984 EPA Groundwater Strategy, supra note 2, at 48.
84. To strengthen EPA's internal groundwater organization, the 1984 strategy
calls for the establishment of a new Office of Ground-Water Protection (OGWP).
EPA's OGWP was in fact established on April 2, 1984. OGWP serves to coordinate
EPA's groundwater protection program, to support groundwater protection efforts by
the states, and will also serve as an EPA spokesperson on legislative matters affecting
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An Interjurisdictional Approach to Groundwater
Protection

Introduction

The 1984 EPA groundwater strategy, with its emphasis
on state responsibility for groundwater pollution control, represents the most recent step in the reversal of a twenty-five
year trend toward increased federal involvement in this
field.8 5 As expressed under many of the environmental laws,
the federal and state governments are to Work in a partnership. In practice, a much different relationship has developed,
one which has resulted in negative attitudes between the partners. In the 1970's, EPA demonstrated a distrust of the ability
and desire of the states to protect their waters. In fact, EPA
appeared to believe that states must be forced to develop protective standards, sometimes exhibiting the attitude "that
everybody is presumably guilty until proven innocent, and
that the only organization that can define and solve environmental problems is EPA."" In the 1980's, however, EPA itself
has suffered many problems of credibility and stability. 7
groundwater. See id. at 49-51. The House Government Operations Committee has
recommended that EPA develop specific internal procedures to assure that OGWP
will be made aware of pending matters in the various program offices and that OGWP
views will be given due consideration in such matters. The authority to resolve any
irreconcilable differences of opinion between OGWP and the program offices should
be at a higher level within EPA. See Groundwater Protection,supra note 62, at 18.
85. See Jolly, State and Federal Roles in National Water Cleanup, 55 State
Gov't 115 (1982).
86. Water for Living: An Interview With Frederick A. Eidness Jr., EPA J.,
Mar.-April 1982, at 9.
87. It should also be noted that Congressional concern over groundwater contamination prompted the creation of a National Ground Water Commission. The Commission consists of nineteen members: ten members of Congress; eight individuals
appointed by the President from public and private sectors; and the Director of Congress's Office of Technology Assessment (OTA). The Commission's charge is to undertake extensive data accumulation and assessment including the extent and sources
of contamination, the role of land use, the adequacy of existing standards, overdrafting, the relationship between surface and ground waters, technological abilities, research, and the roles of federal, state, and local governments in managing groundwater quality and quantity. The Commission must report its findings and
recommendations for legislative and administrative actions to the President-and Congress. It must perform this task by January 1, 1987, when it will cease to exist. See
Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 704, 98 Stat.
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Both the expansion of the federal role in environmental
control in the 1970's and the subsequent movement during
the 1980's back to state control are objectionable for many
reasons: budgetary, informational, and technological restrictions being three of the most important. While strong arguments can be made for local jurisdiction, important exceptions
remain. These arise primarily "where there is undue political
influence at local levels, where there is sufficient interjurisdictional pollution, and where technological considerations give
substantially greater efficiency to larger jurisdictions in either
providing technical information or in carrying out control
responsibilities."8 8
B. Recent Developments in
Groundwater

Federal Jurisdiction Over

Two Constitutional provisions have played central roles
in resolving conflicts between states and regions: the commerce clause" and the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
over controversies involving states.90 In Sporhase v. Nebraska,91 the United States Supreme Court declared that a
Nebraska statute limiting groundwater exports from the state
in an attempt to protect the state's water supplies from diversion was an unconstitutional burden on the flow of interstate
commerce, and therefore violative of the commerce clause.
This case presented a fundamental challenge to the states'
traditional powers to regulate water within their borders. Congress is the regulator of interstate commerce, although it may
delegate by statute, within certain limits, to the states the
ability to regulate commerce in particular commercial areas.
However, the Court in Sporhase concluded that Congress had
not legitimized the burden which the Nebraska statute at is3221, 3289-93 (1984).
88. Zerbe, supra note 16, at 245.
89. "The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce ... among the
several States .... U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl.3.
90. "In all Cases... in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall
have original Jurisdiction." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
91. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
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sue placed on interstate commerce, thus the statute was held
unconstitutional.
Sporhase was soon followed and expanded upon in City
of El Paso v. Reynolds. 2 The district court concluded that a

New Mexico statute barring out-of-state export of groundwater constituted an unconstitutional burden on interstate
commerce and indicated that only the strongest conservation
rationale could justify such a law.9 3 Agricultural needs were
rejected by the court as insufficient.94
Although these two cases are concerned with water scarcity problems and state regulation of water export, the clear
definition under Sporhase of groundwater as an article of
commerce suggests that Congress remains its ultimate regulator.9 s "The Supreme Court has long construed the commerce
clause not only as a grant of power to Congress, but as a limitation on states' power to legislate." ' While the commerce
clause power has been used extensively as a vehicle for controlling pollution and allocation of the nations navigable
streams and non-navigable tributaries, 97 the usefulness of the
commerce power to control groundwater pollution has only
92. 563 F. Supp. 379 (D.N.M. 1983).
93. Id. at 391.
94. Id. at 390.
95. See U.S. Const., art I, § 8, cl.3.
96. See Note, The Commerce Clause and Federalism: Implications for State
Control of Natural Resources, 50 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 601 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
The federal courts have assumed the leading role in curbing protectionist state measures and invalidating many of these measures even in the absence of relevant congressional action. A potential explanation for the Court's long delay in applying the
undue burden test when considering interstate resource conflicts is that these conflicts are regional and systemic as well as technologically complex. See Stewart, Interstate Resource Conflicts: The Role of the FederalCourts, 6 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 241,
251-52 & n.73 (1982). The first cases to invalidate state measures under the commerce
clause in the absence of congressional action were the Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (11
How.) 283 (1849); Cooley v. Board of Wardens 53 U.S. (12 How.) 229, 319 (1851)
(absent congressional action, states may act in "local" matters affecting interstate
commerce, but never in "national" matters). See also City of Milwaukee v. Illinois,
451 U.S. 304, 325 (1981) ("The invocation of federal common law .. . control.").
97. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981); Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); New Jersey
v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296
(1921).
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been speculative. Such speculation is resolved by the Court's
holding in Sporhase.
Other constitutional provisions which affirmatively grant
power to Congress to control groundwater pollution include
the supremacy clause, 8 the compact clause,99 and the general
welfare taxing and spending clause. 0 0 Federal law preempts
state law by implication when there is an irreconcilable conflict between state law and federal law,' or when Congress,
through statutory language or legislative history, has expressed a "clear and manifest purpose" to occupy the field
covered by the federal statute.10 2
C.

The InterjurisdictionalApproach

It is submitted that any comprehensive approach to
groundwater protection must recognize and incorporate the
following basic assumptions:
(1) Groundwater is a valuable natural resource and its
contamination will have adverse effects on human health and
the environment.
(2) Groundwater does not conform to state and political
boundaries and pollution problems cannot be solved through
zealous adherence to boundaries.
(3) There are differences in quality and quantity of
groundwater within the United States as well as differences in
geology and hydrology in geographic areas.
98. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land." The preemption doctrine which
arises from the supremacy clause requires that federal law displace state law whenever the latter "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress." See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67-68
(1941).
99. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, .. . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State."
100. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. "The Congress shall have Power To lay and
collect Taxes ... and provide for the . . . general Welfare of the United States."
101. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 553 (1973).
102. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). For example,
RCRA expressly preempts weaker state regulations, but allows states to issue more
stringent rules. See 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (1982); see also Florini, Issues of Federalism in
Hazardous Waste Control: Cooperation or Confusion?, 6 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 307,
311 (1982).

23

238

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2

(4) There are vast differences among the states in their
focus on groundwater problems, in legal treatment, management systems, and technological and financial abilities.
(5) Current federal institutions are inadequate in terms of
administrative capacity and knowledge of local conditions to
implement a national groundwater strategy.
(6) A national policy is needed that encourages and supports a comprehensive and scientifically well balanced strategy to protect the resource by providing for orderly development, proper use, and conservation of groundwater in all
major aquifers.
The above assumptions suggest the premise that regional,
interjurisdictional control of groundwater pollution represents
the optimal approach to insuring groundwater protection.
Formal regional regulatory authority which conforms to geohydrological characteristics and geographical diversity should
be implemented.
The interjurisdictional authority can be created in two
ways: via exercise of the above-described federal powers over
interstate waters, and through interstate compacts among
states included in each regional boundary. However, because
the exercise of federal power over interstate waters often involves litigation, it seems clear that the vesting of regulatory
power in some form of interstate organization is essential to
effective handling of interstate groundwater pollution
situations.103
D. Federal-InterstateCompacts: A Two-Phase Approach
Several commentators have advocated the use of interstate compacts for regional water resource management. 104 It
103. See Hines, Nor Any Drop To Drink; Public Regulation of Water Quality.
Part II: Interstate Arrangements for Pollution Control, 52 Iowa L. Rev. 432, 433
(1966).
104. See generally Muys, Interstate Water Compacts (July 1971) (a study prepared for the National Water Commission and published by the U.S. Dep't of Commerce, National Technical Information Service (PB 202 998)) [hereinafter cited as
Interstate Water Compacts]; Muys, Interstate Compacts and Regional Water Resources Planning and Management, 6 Nat. Resources Law. 153 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Muys]; Fischer, Management of Interstate Groundwater, 7 Nat. Resources
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has been observed that "[p]ollution control on interstate
streams has been viewed consistently by the Supreme Court,
Congress, and commentators as a problem area particularly
susceptible of regional solution through interstate compact."' 1 5 It has also been observed that the interstate compact
approach offers the particular advantages of finality, flexibility, and expertise.106 However, it has also been noted that
"[tihe broad constitutional powers of the federal government
Law. 521 (1974).
105. Muys, supra note 104, at 157 (footnotes omitted). The author further notes
that:
In its 1921 decision in the interstate litigation between New York and
New Jersey over pollution of the Hudson River [New York v. New Jersey,
256 U.S. 296 (1921)], the Supreme Court expressed its view that a cooperative attack on pollution through interstate agreement was a more positive
approach to such problems than adversary litigation. New York, New Jersey,
and Connecticut subsequently entered into the Tri-State Compact in 1935 to
deal with water quality problems in New York Harbor. Since that time there
have been at least ten additional compacts which deal with interstate water
pollution in various fashions, ranging from bilateral agreements, such as that
between California and Oregon on the Klamath River, to such multilateral
treatments as the Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Compact among eight
states of the Ohio River Basin. The powers that may be exercised by the
commissions created by these compacts span the spectrum from the Potomac
River Commission's carefully circumscribed authority to study, report on,
and recommend remedial actions on the pollution problems of that basin to
the broad water quality standard-setting and enforcement powers of the Delaware and Susquehanna River Basin Commissions.
Id. at 157-58 (footnotes omitted).
106. These advantages of the interstate compact approach are detailed as
follows:
(1) Finality. The interstate compact, when properly ratified, becomes
fully the law of the land insofar as the contract provides. It will be recognized
in the courts of the affected states as well as by the [c]ourts of the United
States. (2) Flexibility. A well drawn compact, though final, has flexibility. It
may provide that particular rules and regulations may be modified, adjusted,
or changed to meet changing circumstances, or to conform to new information concerning the ground water resource. (3) Expertise. Customarily, compacts are negotiated by knowledgeable representatives of the compacting
states, with the assistance of a knowledgeable representative of the United
States government. Persons knowledgeable and experienced in an area, with
sufficient time and ability to fully investigate the probable results of a proposed course of action, are much more likely to develop a conclusion which is
both workable and fair than is likely to be the result of less limited effort or
experienced consideration.
Fischer, supra note 104, at 532 (footnote omitted).
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over the development, use, and management of the [niation's
water resources inevitably make it the controlling force in the
success or failure of cooperative state efforts [such as interstate compacts] to deal with regional water problems ....,,1e
Therefore, any successful interstate compact designed to protect groundwater must include the federal government as a
1 08
full partner in the endeavor.
The goal of any federal-interstate compact to protect
groundwater must be the creation of a hydrologically sound
managerial and administrative system. However, it must be
recognized that the success of any such federal-interstate
compact depends initially upon Congressional action, as "the
Constitution requires Congressional consent for all such com107. Muys, supra note 104, at 159.
108. One example of such interstate-federal cooperation is the Delaware River
Basin Compact, which created the Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC). See
generally id. at 160-63. "[Tlhe DRBC is charged with formulating a 'comprehensive
plan' for the development and use of the basin's waters, and is endowed with broad
planning, regulatory, and project construction powers to aid in implementing the basin plan." Id. at 161. In addition:
The structure of the DRBC itself facilitates interstate and federal-state cooperation. The heart of the compact is the constraint which Commission approval of the comprehensive plan places on the water resource programs of
the signatory parties. All federal, state, and local water project planners are
required to conform their projects to the DRBC's comprehensive plan [whose
content is determined by majority vote].
Id. at 162. Congress has provided in the legislation consenting to the compact that
the federal government need not shape its projects to a plan with which it is not in
agreement. Id. However, reservation of the consent legislation provides that whenever
a comprehensive plan or revision has been adopted with the concurrence of the Commission member approved by the President, the exercise of powers conferred by law
on any officer, agency, or instrumentality of the United States shall not substantially
conflict. Id. The compact also contains procedural requirements designed to afford
maximum opportunity for the expression of public opinion on significant matters
prior to DRBC decisions. Public hearings are required and all DRBC meetings must
be open to the public. Id. at 162-63.
Note that Congress has recently used interstate compacts to deal with establishment and operation of regional disposal facilities for low-level radioactive wastes. In
1980, Congress incorporated such a provision in the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b)-(d) (1982). The Act authorizes "states to enter into
such compacts as may be necessary to provide for the establishment and operation of
regional disposal facilities" to take effect upon approval by Congress; and if" restricting use of regional facilities to region members," may not take effect before January
1, 1986. See also Florini, supra note 102, at 335.
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pacts in order to allow Congress a veto over any interstate
agreements which might be prejudicial to broader national
interests." 0 9
Parallel with the conclusions of other commentators that
the federal- interstate compact mechanism represents the optimal approach to a viable groundwater protection policy," 0 it
is suggested that a two-phase approach be undertaken by
Congress to implement such a federal-interstate compact. In
the first phase, a select committee on groundwater resources
should be established by Congress. This committee should
have three basic objectives:
(A) To establish a goal of nationwide groundwater
protection.
(B) To devise and create regional commissions with policymaking authority and territorial jurisdiction conforming to
the major aquifer systems of the United States, or alternately,
conforming to the existing eighteen major water resource regions in the coterminous United States established by the
1
United States Water Resources Council. "
(C) To recommend the funding level necessary to implement the goal of nationwide groundwater protection. This
committee would serve only as a transitional agency until its
powers could be exercised by a commission established by a
federal- interstate compact among the states and the federal
government." 2
The transition agency should be given broad powers
109. Muys, supra note 104, at 172.
110. See id. at 163; Fischer, supra note 104, at 546.
111. U.S. Water Resources Council, The Nation's Water Resources 1975-2000
(1978). The membership of each Commission should be comprised of three members
from the federal government, one from each of the following: EPA, USGS, and U.S.
Dep't of Commerce, and members from each state, weighted by land area and population of the included portion of the state, but with each affected state represented by
at least one and no more than three members. All members would be appointed by
the President.
112. Until now the impetus for settlement of interstate problems has come principally from the states. Here, the suggestion for Congress to be the prime mover resuits from the unproductive efforts to encourage joint state action on problems of
regional concern in the area of water pollution control. The states may cooperate
extensively on informal and unofficial levels, but this activity is no substitute for an
organized continuing regional control effort. See Hines, supra note 103, at 456.
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including:
(1) Authority to require hydrological description and
investigation of each aquifer in the region and predictive
capabilities necessary for effective management of the
groundwater. 1' 3
(2) Authority to establish enforcement powers, including civil and criminal penalties. 1 '
(3) Authority to initiate taxing and spending powers.
(4) Authority to establish an information retrieval
system.
Justification for the establishment of a federally-oriented
interim agency as an initial step towards a federal-interstate
compact may be found on several grounds. First, Congress
could enact the required legislation more quickly than a federal-interstate compact, with all its legal complications, could
be negotiated and ratified. Second, Congress would be more
receptive to funding a federal agency for the initial period. Finally, a federal agency would recognize the paramount national interest in groundwater pollution control of the area in
question until such time as the legal framework for shifting
the power center to a regional compact commission could be
15
established.'
In the second phase, legislation should be enacted by
Congress which would enable and further the creation of federal-interstate compacts which will fulfill the overall goal of
nation wide groundwater protection through a hydrologically
sound regional framework. This legislation should allow the
permanent regional compact commission of the area in question to address the following issues:
(1) Methods of making parallel or reconciling the
differences of state laws concerning groundwater
protection.
113. This authority could be coordinated by the Regional Aquifer-System Analysis Program (RASA) established by the U.S. Geological Survey.
114. See Muys, supra note 104, at 182.
115. See Interstate Water Compacts, supra note 104, at 128.
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(2) Sources of finance and priority funds.
(3) Means of agency responsibility.
(4) Classification of acquifers as to quality and use.
(5) Land use decisions to protect critical acquifer
recharge areas.
(6) Permitting and monitoring strategies.
(7) Economic incentives and disincentives.
(8) Exemptive status.
More specific policy considerations have also been recommended for
inclusion
in federal-interstate
compact
legislation. 1 6
V.

Conclusion

Groundwater is one of the nation's most important natural resources. Contamination of it must be controlled to protect public health as well as the environment at large. Under116. These include:
(1) "[Aldvance consent should be granted to a limited class of compacts
not having a significant impact on federal interests." Muys, supra note 104,
at 176.
(2) Existing federal-interstate compacts with groundwater pollution control authority should be left intact and strengthened where necessary. The
signatory parties to existing surface water interstate pollution control compacts should be encouraged to include groundwater in the compact commission authority and to make the federal government a signatory party. Failure
to incorporate groundwater protection in the existing interstate compact described above would necessitate including those states in the contemplated
Congressional legislative scheme.
(3) Federal district court jurisdiction should be granted over all water
compact matters. Id.
(4) The roles of existing federal agencies and pollution control programs
with respect to their relationship to the compact commission should be clarified. Id.
(5) The compact agency should preempt the standard setting authority
of the member states only to the extent that the compact agency standards
must be minimal standards throughout the region. The individual states
should remain free to establish more stringent standards. Id. at 182.
(6) Compact agency decisions should be rendered by a majority vote and
veto power by the affected state over enforcement action should be prohibited. Id. at 183.
(7) The need for compact amendment and new ratification and consent
legislation should be minimized to the extent possible. Id. at 185.
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ground aquifers do not assume a configuration resembling
state political boundaries. Furthermore, existing state and
federal agencies have thus far been unable to adequately address the problem of groundwater pollution. Because standardized solutions in ,an area as complex tas groundwater pollution do not work, EPA has been unable to formulate an
acceptable nationwide groundwater protection strategy. A new
and different jurisdictional framework should be devised to
overcome institutional and political weaknesses. The vesting
of regulatory and enforcement: power in a federal-interstate
organization represents the optimum interjurisdictional approach, as well as the political and technical ideal
The Supreme Court has declared groundwater to be an
article of commerce. Therefore, Congress should exercise its
plenary powers to enact legislation which will enable a hydrologically sound managerial and administrative system to be
imposed as a federal-interstate compact. The organizational
plan should be based on a two-phased approach. A federallyoriented transition agency with broad authority should first
be established as the initial step towards a federal-interstate
compact. Once in force, a compact commission would replace
the transition agency and be assigned its powers. The federalinterstate compact approach recognizes that "[o]ur regions are
realities. Political thinking must respond to these realities. Instead of leading to parochialism, it will bring a fresh ferment
of political thought whereby national aims may be achieved
' '117
through various forms of political adjustments.

117. Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study
in Interstate Adjustments, 34 Yale L.J. 685, 729 (1925).
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